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Abstract
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Introduction

The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 stated that its goal was “to restore
liquidity and stability to the …nancial system of the United States.”To this end, the
act originally gave the Treasury authority to purchase up to $700 billion in illiquid
“troubled assets.”Indeed, it now seems clear that before the late 2000s crisis, …nancial
institutions systematically overinvested in illiquid assets and underinvested in safe,
liquid assets. Should this pattern surprise us? In general, do agents in competitive
markets systematically choose to provide too little liquidity?
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the seminal analysis on the tradeo¤ between
safe, short term assets and higher yielding, long term assets that may be illiquid in the
short run. The tension is that while investors want high average returns, they may
experience liquidity shocks and require cash before the maturity of their long term
investments. With access to a su¢ ciently rich set of assets, competitive equilibrium in
such economies is e¢ cient, and investors achieve optimal liquidity insurance. However,
as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) observe, this set of assets would need to contain
derivatives that condition payments on the needs of individual investors. As liquidity
needs often are private information or di¢ cult to observe, competitive asset markets
of this kind will likely be limited.
The basic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework consists of three periods and
two technologies, a high yielding one that takes two periods to mature and a one
period storage technology that is “liquid” in the sense that in the middle period its
resources are available to consume. In the …rst period, the ex ante identical agents
divide their resources between the two technologies. In the second period, agents
may consume and trade bonds, but they cannot liquidate long term investments. In
the third period, returns are realized, and the agents consume. Uncertainty and the
need for insurance stem from the fact that in the second period agents face random
liquidity shocks. In particular, agents randomly di¤er in how they discount future
utility; that is, they di¤er in impatience. The sudden impatience represents, for
example, the possibility that an investor might experience a random medical problem
or that a …nancial …rm might have to honor a credit default swap. We extend this
idiosyncratic risk to allow for aggregate risk: both the fraction of the population at
each impatience level and the long term return are stochastic. Consequently, the
interest rate that emerges in the middle period is also stochastic.
At this point in their analysis, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) took a sharp turn.
They moved away from competitive and anonymous markets and introduced banks
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and …nancial intermediaries. Their paper shows that such institutions may improve
upon stark incomplete markets by o¤ering incentive compatible contracts to investors.
In the original Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, a standard bank deposit contract
is incentive compatible and su¢ cient for optimal insurance, even when liquidity needs
are private information. The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) analysis is famous for a
nasty side e¤ect of bank deposit contracts: their model exhibits multiple equilibria.
While one equilibrium yields optimal insurance, the other consists of a bank run,
which is worse than autarky. So, in overcoming the private information problem, the
market becomes fundamentally fragile.
While most related papers follow Diamond and Dybvig’s lead and study bank runs
or intermediary contracting problems, we return to the simpler Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) setting consisting of just individual investors and competitive asset markets.
We answer our original question by showing that in our Diamond and Dybvig setting,
agents always underinvest in short term, liquid assets.
We require two mild assumptions: (1) Absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing. (2)
Ex ante, investors place more weight on their future impatient selves than on their
future patient selves. Almost all commonly used utility functions satisfy (1); Arrow
(1965) wrote that violations of decreasing absolute risk aversion are problematic.
Assumption (2) is simply the embodiment of liquidity shocks being emergencies, which
are associated with high marginal utility, all else equal.
Our main result (Theorem 1) is that under (1) and (2), all incomplete markets
competitive equilibria are constrained ine¢ cient: agents overinvest in the illiquid, long
term technology. The investors would all be better o¤ ex ante if they each decided to
shift some resources from the longer illiquid investment to the liquid investment. That
welfare rises is surprising: weighting their impatient selves more, that is, realizing
liquidity shocks are emergencies, the investors were already allocating extra to the
short term technology as insurance against liquidity shocks. However, in equilibrium,
they do not allocate enough.
A pecuniary externality is at play. When every individual shifts resources from
long term to short term they depress the middle period interest rates, reallocating
resources from middle period lenders (individuals who turned out to be patient) to
borrowers (individuals who turned out to be impatient). When an individual shifts
his own resources from long term to short term, he is shifting money from the last
period to the middle period whether or not he turns out to be impatient.1
1

We prove in Theorem 1 that the over investment stems from the argument in the last paragraph,
that when impatience is caused by emergencies, the utility from impatient selves is weighted more

3

A key step in deriving the ine¢ ciency of competitive investment is proving that
the interest rate between the last two periods falls when agents get richer in the
penultimate period and poorer in the …nal period. To sign this static, it su¢ ces to
show that the resulting two period economies always display stability, so we are able
to employ the results of Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016), who show that in two good,
I agent economies with common Bernoulli utilities and common endowments but
arbitrary heterogeneous discounts, nonincreasing absolute risk aversion guarantees
stability.
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature on liquidity provision in three
main ways. First, most papers following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) study the intermediary contracting problem, the interaction of intermediaries, or security design. We
show that the welfare and policy results of this literature arise in a simple competitive
equilibrium setting. We suggest that the main implications and lessons stem simply
from market incompleteness, and not from private information mechanism design.
Second, we employ weaker assumptions in proving overinvestment in the long term
technology. While our main assumption is nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, previous authors impose some combination of CRRA u, homothetic u, numerical bounds
on relative risk aversion, and bounds on the long term return. Third, unlike previous
studies, we allow for aggregate risk in the fraction of the population that turns out
to be impatient (as well as in the long term return), which makes the interest rate
random.
The paper concludes with an extension in which the investors may in the middle
period liquidate the long term technology. In states where the fraction of impatient
agents is particularly high, the long term return is low, or the liquidation return is
high, the interest rate rises to a level that induces the agents to liquidate part of the
long term technology. This …re sale of productive assets is a tangible manifestation
of underinvestment in the short term technology. Theorem 2 shows that the …re sale
economy also exhibits constrained ine¢ cient liquidity underprovision. In a numerical example, forcing agents to provide more liquidity initially and thus to curtail
investment in the more productive long term asset actually increases total production in crisis states of the world: …re sales decline at a rate faster than the increase
than the utility from patient selves. We prove in Theorem 3 that if the patient selves are weighted
su¢ ciently more than the impatient selves, then there is under investment in all equilibria. Finally,
in Theorem 4 we prove that when there is no aggregate risk about the fraction of the population that
turns out to be impatient, then equilibrium is unique, and for almost all ex ante weights individuals
place on their future patient and impatient selves, equilibrium is constrained ine¢ cient: everybody
could be made better o¤ if everybody shifted investment one way or the other.

4

in liquidity.2
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Related Literature

Economists have long discussed the tension …nancial institutions face in deciding
between safe, liquid reserves and more pro…table but illiquid long term investments.
In their Yale College economics textbook, Fairchild, Furniss, and Buck (1937) write,
“The banker is impelled by two counteracting motives, pro…ts and safety.
The bank derives its pro…ts principally from the making of loans and discounts, and the larger its portfolio of loans and discounts the larger in
general will its pro…ts be. But as loans and discounts are made, cash is
immediately withdrawn or deposits are created or the bank’s note issues
are increased. Thus the reserve ratio falls, and the bank’s condition becomes proportionately less safe. To the banker’s desire for pro…ts is thus
opposed the necessity of keeping a safe ratio between the reserve and the
demand liabilities.”(page 439)
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the most famous mathematical treatment of
this topic. They observe, as do we, that standard competitive markets will be inef…cient without state contingent assets. However, rather than addressing constrained
e¢ ciency or possible bene…cial market interventions, these authors analyze the ability
of bank deposit contracts to insure investors and famously observe that such intermediary contracts introduce the possibility of a bank run equilibrium, which is worse
than autarky.
Also, the original Diamond-Dybvig preference structure is quite particular. They
assume that impatient types have the utility function u (c1 ) and that patient types
have the utility function u (c1 + c2 ), where c1 and c2 are …rst and second period
consumption. We suppose that both types have the utility function u (c1 ) + u (c2 ),
where is lower for the impatient agents. Furthermore, unlike Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), we require neither a quantitative bound on relative risk aversion nor a crossrestriction on the long term asset return and the size of the preference shock.
Jacklin (1987) extends Diamond and Dybvig (1983) along two dimensions. First,
he considers both the original Diamond-Dybvig preferences and a preference speci…cation similar to the one we employ. Second, he compares the risk sharing properties
2

Of course in low interest rate states, the curtailment of long term investments reduces production.
Ex ante expected production also may fall. But as our theorems show, expected utility increases for
everyone when illiquid investment is curtailed a little.
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of standard bank deposit contracts with those of an economy in which agents trade
equity shares in a …rm that makes the initial long run/short run portfolio decision.
When agents cannot trade bank deposits, deposit contracts welfare dominate allocations from competitive equity markets because second-best insurance calls for a
wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the technological rate of return.
With competitive, laissez-faire asset markets, investor trade erodes such wedges. Indeed, when agents can retrade bank deposits, allocations from the two mechanisms
coincide. For this reason, Jacklin’s (1987) policy suggestion is the “prohibition of a
frictionless credit market,”in the presence of an existing bank deposit arrangement.
Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) e¤ectively argue, however, that the characterization of Jacklin (1987) is too stark. In their model, intermediaries compete
to design liquidity insurance mechanisms for investors. The catch is that the resulting contracts are non-exclusive in the sense that the intermediaries cannot stop their
customers from trading bonds amongst themselves. With more preference generality than in Jacklin (1987), these authors order by welfare a taxonomy of insurance
arrangements. First-best (SP1 ) allocations maximize ex ante utility subject to resource constraints. Second-best (SP2 ) allocations honor both resource and incentive
compatibility constraints. With the original Diamond-Dybvig preferences, SP1 and
SP2 coincide. When pro…t maximizing intermediaries compete to insure the agents,
Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) refer to the situation as CE2 . As competition
drives pro…ts to zero, CE2 coincides with SP2 . That is, subject to the private information constraint, the government cannot improve on competitive insurance markets.
CE3 arises when price-taking intermediaries compete and investors can privately trade
in competitive bond markets. The observation of Jacklin (1987) is basically that CE3
is worse than SP2 (and CE2 ) and that preventing private retrading improves welfare.
Market forces are e¤ectively an additional constraint.
In contrast, Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) show that CE3 is ine¢ cient
beyond its distinction from CE2 . Speci…cally, they characterize the third-best (SP3 ),
in which the planner maximizes utility subject to resource constraints, incentive constraints (regarding liquidity preferences), and constraints that prevent investor side
trades at the corresponding market prices. SP3 is worse than SP2 because it entails
more constraints. SP3 is, however, better than CE3 because unlike the price-taking
intermediaries, the planner understands how his contracts a¤ect the private market
interest rate. In short, the allocations of CE3 su¤er due to a pecuniary externality.
The key theorem of Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) explains how simple liquidity controls on intermediaries drive the economy from CE3 to SP3 . They show that
6

if the impatient agents have, all else equal, more (less) ex ante utility weight, then
CE3 underprovides (overprovides) liquidity. However, to sign the link between initial
investment and ex ante utility in any case, the authors require either preference homotheticity or a bound on the liquidity shock variance. Thus, our analysis is distinct
both in that we study the case without intermediaries and require just nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion.
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) study a related setting in which intermediaries
insure agents who want to consume either early or late. However, at the time of
initial investment, each intermediary is uncertain about the fraction of “early diers”
he will face and wants to insure against having too many of them. Consequently,
the model of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) is mathematically similar to the general
Diamond-Dybvig setting but has intermediaries instead of individual investors as
its agents. In the parlance of Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009), the focus of
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) is a characterization of SP2 . In particular, they show
how di¤erent assumptions regarding preferences a¤ect the sign of the optimal wedge
between the technological return and the e¤ective interest rate. Also, they observe
that Walrasian interbank markets exhibit “free-rider” problems, but they do not
formalize this argument.
Finally, using the original Diamond-Dybvig preferences, Yared (2013) also considers a case without intermediaries. In his model, agents cannot commit to honoring
debt contracts, but the government can issue bonds for trade (…nanced by taxes).
When the government issues a su¢ cient number of bonds, the economy is equivalent
to one with unconstrained, uncontingent trade between agents. In this case, the equilibrium allocations are ine¢ cient. However, by restricting the supply of bonds, the
government e¤ectively imposes a t = 1 borrowing constraint and under certain conditions can implement the …rst-best. The borrowing constraint helps because it forces
agents to store more initially. So, Yared (2013) also derives an overinvestment result.
Our analysis is distinct from his because (i) he uses the original Diamond-Dybvig
preference/shock assumptions, (ii) his policy intervention involves using …scal policy
to set a borrowing constraint in the middle period of the model, and (iii) he does not
allow for aggregate risk.3
3

See also Allen and Gale (2004) and Grochulski and Zhang (2016).
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Model

Consider an economy consisting of three time periods, t 2 f0; 1; 2g, and a unit mass
of ex ante identical investors. There is a single consumption good in each time period,
and each agent is endowed with e > 0 units of the good at t = 0. At t = 0, each
agent allocates his endowment between two investment technologies. The …rst is a
one period saving technology that yields a gross return of 1 at t = 1. The second
is a long term illiquid investment that gives a gross return of Rs > 0 at t = 2 in
aggregate state s 2 S, where S 1. Let x and y denote the respective allocations to
the short and long term assets. Let es1 (x) and es2 (x) denote the t = 1 and t = 2
endowments conditional on liquid investment x in state s. By de…nition, es1 (x) = x
and es2 (x) = Rs (e x) = Rs y.4 At t = 1, the agents trade one period, riskless bonds
in competitive, anonymous markets.
While investors do not consume at t = 0, they derive utility from consumption at
t = 1 and t = 2 according to the twice continuously di¤erentiable Bernoulli utility
function u, which satis…es u0 > 0 , u00 < 0, and limx#0 u0 (x) = 1. At t = 0, the
agents face two forms of uncertainty. First, agents randomly have di¤erent tastes for
consumption at t = 1 and t = 2. That is, they have di¤erent degrees of impatience,
and each investor learns his type at t = 1. Second, there is aggregate risk concerning
the probability distribution of types and the t = 2 return. As the t = 1 interest rate
depends on the distribution of types, this uncertainty introduces interest rate risk.
Suppose there are I > 1 impatience types indexed by i. Type i is distinguished
by the pair (wi ; i )
0. We suppose the state s, t = 1 present value utility of
impatience type i is
wi u cis1 + i u cis2 ;
where cist is the consumption of type i at t 2 f1; 2g in state s 2 S. Parameter
i
represents the patience of type i. If i < j ; then i is more impatient than j.
Parameter wi weights the utility of di¤erent types. If in addition to i < j we
also have wi i wj j ; then ex ante type i is valued more than type j, because the
present value weights are higher for i in period 1 and at least as high in period 2. We
suppose that impatience increases because of emergencies, which increase the utility
of contemporaneous consumption. The case with wi i = wj j corresponds to the one
4

Since e is arbitrary and completely invested in the two assets (there is no t = 0 consumption), it
is without loss of generality to …x the short term return at 1. If the short term return were R0 > 0,
then the t = 0 tradeo¤ would be between a t = 1 return of R0 or a t = 2 return of Rs . This is
equivalent to letting the initial endowment be ee = R0 e and setting the t = 1 and t = 2 returns to 1
and Rs =R0 , respectively.
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described in footnote 5 of independent and equally likely emergencies each period.5
There are S possible type distributions: 1 ; :::; S , where s = s1 ; :::; sI and
i
s is the probability of becoming type i conditional on distribution s. Let Ps > 0
be the t = 0 probability of realizing distribution s at t = 1. Assume, as usual, that
i
s is both the probability of becoming type i as well as the fraction of agents that
realize type i. By relabeling the impatience types as necessary, it is without loss of
generality to order the agents as follows: 1 < ::: < I .
Let qs be the t = 1 price of a bond paying 1 at t = 2. As the agents are the same
ex ante, they choose the same x at t = 0 and thus have identical endowments at t = 1
and t = 2. However, because they di¤er in impatience, they trade in bonds at t = 1.
The type distribution determines the gains from trade and thus the market clearing
interest rate. Hence, the bond price has an s subscript. De…ne q (q1 ; :::; qS ). Let
bis denote the bond holdings of type i conditional on state s. The t = 0 budget set of
an agent is thus

Be (q; e) =

8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:

i2I

(x; y) ; (cis1 ; cis2 ; bis )s2S 2 R2+
cis1

+

qs bis

9
R3SI j 8i 2 I; s 2 S >
>
>
>
=

x + y e;
x; cis2 Rs y + bis ;
cis1 ; cis2 0

>
>
>
>
;

:

Note that because there are no bond market frictions, it is without loss of generality
5
Our analysis would be the same even if emergencies were equally likely to come in period 1 or
period 2. Suppose that every agent has probability p of facing an emergency in the middle period
and the same probability p of facing an emergency in the last period. These risks are indepedent
across periods and across agents. Suppose that in case of an emergency, the Bernoulli utility of
consumption is multiplied by > 1: Let = p + (1 p)1:
Let ct be consumption in period t if there is no emergency in period t; and let ctE be consumption
in period t if there is an emergency in period t. Since there are no insurance markets, conditional
on what happens in the middle period, agents will consume the same amount c2 = c2E whether or
not they face an emergency in the last period. Conditional on being in an emergency in period 1,
an agent will be maximizing
u(c1E ) + u(c2 ):

Conditional on not being in an emergency in period 1, an agent will be maximizing
u(c1 ) +

u(^
c2 )

The upshot is that an agent who faces an emergency in period 1 acts as if he is more impatient
than an agent who does not face an emergency in period 1. Just as importantly, assuming that ex
ante agents maximize the expectation of these utilities, one can see that more weight is put on the
impatient self than the patient self in the sense that the period 1 utility of the impatient (emergency)
self is weighted more than the period 1 utility of the patient (nonemergency) self, and the expected
period 2 utility (of the period 1 emergency self) is weighted at least as much as the expected period
2 utility of the nonemergency period 1 self.
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to assume that the agents simultaneously trade t = 1 and t = 2 consumption goods
at respective prices 1 and qs . Conditional on (x; y) and aggregate state s, the setting becomes a classic I agent, two good endowment economy. We can ignore bond
holdings and write the budget set as

B (q; e) =

8
>
>
<

i2I
(x; y) ; (cis1 ; cis2 )s2S

2

R2+

R2SI
+

9
j 8i 2 I; s 2 S >
>
=

x + y e;
i
cs1 + qs cis2 x + qs Rs y

>
>
:

>
>
;

The t = 0 problem of each investor is thus
max
i2I
(x;y);(cis1 ;cis2 )
s2S

S
X
s=1

Ps

I
X

u cis1 +

i i
sw

i

u cis2

:

such that

(1)

i=1

(x; y) ; cis1 ; cis2

i2I
s2S

2 B (q; e) :

Given e, de…ne cist (x; qs ) to be time t consumption demand at bond price qs and
endowment (x; Rs (e x)). We now de…ne competitive equilibrium.
De…nition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) Competitive equilibrium consists of
prices qs ( 8s 2 S), a short term asset investment x (liquidity), and consumption
choices cist = cist (x ; qs ) ( 8i 2 I, s 2 S, t 2 f1; 2g) such that:
1. Given prices, (x ; e

s2S

x ) ; (cis1 ; cis2 )i2I

solves the t = 0 investor problem (1).

2. Markets clear for all s 2 S:
I
X
i=1
I
X

i i
s cs1

=x

i i
s cs2

= Rs (e

x ):

i=1

From the assumptions on u, competitive equilibrium exists, and in equilibrium
there is an interior solution for liquidity:
Proposition 1 (Existence) A competitive equilibrium exists and x 2 (0; e).
Proposition 1 stems from the following observation: as x approaches 0, the interest rate diverges to in…nity in all states, encouraging high investment in x. As x
10

approaches e, the gross interest rate goes to 0, encouraging high investment in y. By
continuity, there is an intermediate x that constitutes an equilibrium.6
Note that Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume there are two types and that patient
and impatient utility are, respectively, u (c1 + c2 ) and u (c1 ), where < 1, R > 1,
and relative risk aversion is greater than or equal to 1. While our speci…cation is
not technically a generalization of the classical Diamond and Dybvig (1983) one, our
general setting exhibits the same tensions and tradeo¤s as those of the classical model.
Moreover, our version is the standard representation of time variation in “taste” for
consumption. In the classical setting, patient and impatient agents have qualitatively
di¤erent preferences: while for the former c1 and c2 are perfect substitutes, for the
latter t = 2 goods are completely useless. In contrast, we follow Jacklin (1987),
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), and Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) and analyze
the case in which t = 1 and t = 2 goods are imperfect substitutes for both types.

4

Welfare Analysis

As there are not complete t = 0 insurance markets for emergency risk, competitive
equilibrium is not ex ante Pareto e¢ cient. In this section, we show that equilibrium
is also constrained ine¢ cient (Theorem 1): decreasing absolute risk aversion implies
investors systematically underinvest in liquidity.
Once agents have chosen their initial investment x, the economy reduces to a
simple collection of S two period economies. Observe that after each agent chooses
x; his budget set in each state s if he is of impatience type i reduces to
B (qs ; e; x; s) =

cis1 ; cis2 2 R2+ j cis1 + qs cis2

x + qs Rs (e

x) :

We now de…ne competitive equilibrium conditional on x:
De…nition 2 (Competitive Equilibrium Conditional on x) Competitive
equilibrium conditional on x consists of prices qs (x) ( 8s 2 S) and consumption
choices cist (x) = cist (x; qs (x)) ( 8i 2 I, s 2 S, t 2 f1; 2g) such that:
1. Given qs (x), we have (cis1 (x) ; cis2 (x)) 2 B (qs (x) ; e; x; s), and (c1 ; c2 ) 2 B (qs (x) ; e; x; s)
implies
wi u cis1 (x) + i u cis2 (x)
wi u (c1 ) + i u ci2 :
6
Given x 2 (0; e), the model reduces to a collection of two good, I agent economies in which
existence and continuity follow from standard arguments.
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Markets clear for all s 2 S:
I
X
i=1
I
X

i i
s cs1

(x) = x

i i
s cs2

(x) = Rs (e

x) :

i=1

Given arbitrary bond prices q and liquidity x, we can de…ne ex ante utility V (x; q):
V (x; q) =

max
i2I
(cis1 ;cis2 )s2S

S
X
s=1

Ps

I
X

i i
sw

u cis1 +

i

u cis2

such that

(2)

i=1

cis1 ; cis2 2 B (qs ; e; x; s) :

Therefore, conditional on x equilibrium ex ante utility is V (x; q (x)), and competitive
equilibrium ex ante utility is V (x ; q (x )). Consider now the t = 0 problem of a
benevolent planner who is able to force all of the investors into a particular short
term savings level x but then must stand idly by while markets clear. The planner
can anticipate that each agent will wind up with expected utility V (x; q (x)) : As
his policy a¤ects all agents, the planner, unlike the atomistic individuals, internalizes
how x impacts qs across di¤erent realizations of s . Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986) described a method for proving that generically in these types of situations
with incomplete markets, the planner can improve utility by choosing x that di¤ers
from competitive equilibrium. Here we sharpen that conclusion by proving that the
planner can always improve utility by increasing x beyond competitive equilibrium
x.
De…ne a ( )
u00 ( ) =u0 ( ) to be the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. u satis…es declining absolute risk aversion (DARA) if a (c)
a (c0 ) whenever
c c0 . We now state our main result.
j
Theorem 1 Suppose (i) u satis…es DARA and (ii) if i
then wi i wj j .
Then every competitive equilibrium is ex ante constrained ine¢ cient. In particular,
all investors could be made better o¤ by collectively allocating more to the short term
asset: the function V : (0; e) RS++ ! R is di¤erentiable, and at every equilibrium,
x 2 (0; e) and
d
V (x; q (x))
> 0:
dx
x=x

Proof. See Appendix.
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Condition (ii) says, essentially, that agents put more ex ante weight on their
impatient selves than on their patient selves, which causes them to choose higher x
than if they put equal weight on their future selves. The theorem says that, despite
this, they would all be better o¤ if they all chose still higher x (and thus lower y).
In short, condition (ii) and DARA imply overinvestment in the long term, illiquid
asset. Furthermore, one can show that interest rates are highest exactly when the
fraction of impatient agents is highest. Hence, investors realize that they are most
likely to become impatient exactly when borrowing rates will be highest. These high
rates in impatient times incline them to allocate more to the short investment than
they would have otherwise. But, as Theorem 1 tells us, the investors do not allocate
enough to the short term asset: no one agent a¤ects the interest rate, which is the
tool by which all are made better o¤ collectively.
Intuitively, increasing liquidity above x has two e¤ects. First, by stability the
interest rate falls (the price of t = 2 goods rises) as the relative supply of t = 1
goods rises. For all realizations of s, the falling rate redistributes from the lenders
(the patient agents) to the borrowers (the impatient agents). As there is more utility
weight on the impatient agents, ex ante utility increases (as does ex post utility, on
average). The second e¤ect is that each agent’s t = 1 (t = 2) endowment rises (falls).
In states where the interest rate is high, this e¤ect actually bene…ts all agents, holding
constant the price. When the interest rate is low, everyone is hurt. The question is,
what is the overall balance of these endowment e¤ects? Can they overwhelm the
bene…cial redistribution e¤ect? The answer is no. As we see in the Date 0 Lemma,
this balancing is exactly the margin on which each agent is choosing x to begin
with. At x , these endowment e¤ects completely wash out. Only the redistribution
e¤ect remains, which means increasing liquidity (local to x ) unambiguously improves
utility ex ante.
A key step in proving Theorem 1 is establishing stability of equilibrium, which
follows from the results of Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016). They show that utility separability, DARA, common endowments, and common Bernoulli utilities are su¢ cient
for uniqueness and stability in two good, I agent economies, which are what emerge
in the present analysis after x is chosen and uncertainty is resolved. The key step in
proving stability is in establishing that total demand for t = 2 goods is downward
sloping in q for any x and realization of s. Why is DARA su¢ cient for downward
sloping demand? Proving su¢ ciency amounts to showing that the income e¤ects of
relatively impatient agents are not too strong. Patient agents, who are savers, necessarily have downward sloping demand: the substitution e¤ect in the Slutsky equation
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is negative by separability and concavity, and the income e¤ect term is negative because they are buyers of t = 2 goods. For very impatient agents, however, the income
e¤ect may be positive because the most impatient agents are borrowing (they are
sellers of t = 2 goods). DARA is su¢ cient for showing that the total income e¤ect
is negative. Speci…cally, this assumption ensures that the patient agents have the
largest (absolute value) income e¤ects. Why? The most patient agents consume the
most t = 2 goods. If a (c)
a (c0 ) whenever c
c0 , these agents have the least
sensitive marginal utility of consumption for these goods. If you give an investor a
splash of income, he allocates between t = 1 and t = 2 goods, keeping constant the
ratio of marginal utilities. With highly insensitive marginal utility for t = 2 goods, a
patient agent will change consumption of t = 2 goods a lot just to the maintain the
ratio. See the Appendix and Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016) for more details.
Curtailing short term investment is not always the right intervention. If instead of
condition (ii) we assume w1 w2 ::: wN , then there is always underinvestment
in the long term technology, which we prove as Theorem 3 in the Appendix. If the
w’s satisfy Equation 9 in the Appendix, then equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient. Is
9 a knife-edge case? When S = 1, we can prove the answer is yes: Theorem 4 in the
Appendix considers the classical case of no aggregate risk about the fraction of the
population that turns out to be impatient. We prove that equilibrium is unique, and
for almost all ex ante weights (w1 ; :::; wI ) individuals place on their future patient
and impatient selves, equilibrium is constrained ine¢ cient: everybody could be made
better o¤ if everybody shifted investment one way or the other.7
In comparison with the existing literature, our assumption of DARA is weaker than
those employed in previous papers, which impose some combination of CRRA u, homothetic u, numerical bounds on relative risk aversion, and restrictions on Rs . Some
variation of condition (ii) has been needed in previous papers to establish underinvestment in liquidity. A special case is wi = 1= i , which implies w1 1 = ::: = wI I = 1.
wi = 1= i corresponds to the “liquidity shock”case from Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) and is similar to the original Diamond-Dybvig speci…cation. Finally, while
most other papers emphasize the role of banks or intermediaries in creating ine¢ ciencies, we derive and sign constrained ine¢ ciency in a simple setting consisting of just
anonymous trade in competitive asset markets.
7

With S > 1, we conjecture Theorem 4 would still hold, but the proof would be more di¢ cult.
Theorem 4 does not follow from Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) because in the present paper
we have …xed individual endowments at 0 (all consumption comes from production). Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986) prove constrained ine¢ ciency for almost all endowments, not for any …xed
set of individual endowments.
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5

Fire Sales

We now change the model so that agents are able to liquidate the long term investment
at a …re sale rate at t = 1. In particular, after uncertainty is resolved, an agent may
liquidate an amount Lis , where 0
Lis
y. Doing so yields a …re sale return of
i
rs Ls at t = 1, where rs > 0, and means that the agent’s t = 2 endowment falls to
Rs (y Lis ). The t = 0 problem of each investor thus becomes

max

i2I

(x;y);(cis1 ;cis2 ;Lis )

s2S

BL (q; e) =

Let Ls =

I
X

i i
s Ls

8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:

S
X

Ps

s=1

I
X

i i
sw

u cis1 +

i

u cis2

(3)

such that

i=1

(x; y) ; cis1 ; cis2 ; Lis

i2I
s2S

2 BL (q; e)

9
>
j
8i
2
I;
s
2
S
R3SI
>
+
>
>
=

i2I

(x; y) ; (cis1 ; cis2 ; Lis )s2S 2 R2+

cis1 + qs cis2

x+y e
0 Lis y
(x + rs Lis ) + qs Rs (y

>
>
>
>
;

Lis )

:

be the total …re sale liquidation. Competitive equilibrium is as in

i=1

De…nition 1, except the market clearing conditions become
I
X

i=1
I
X

i i
s cs1

= x + rs Ls

i i
s cs2

= Rs (e

x

(4)

Ls ) :

i=1

In contrast with the rs = 0 version in which liquidation is impossible, here a
high interest rate (1=qs ) induces t = 1 liquidation, resulting in a decline in t = 2
production. Indeed, if 1=qs > Rs =rs in state s, agents would fully liquidate the long
term technology, consuming at t = 2 only via the bond market. This complete …re
sale, however, could never be an equilibrium because it would violate t = 2 market
clearing (4). Therefore, in state s of the …re sale equilibrium either 1=qs = Rs =rs and
agents are indi¤erent to liquidation or 1=qs < Rs =rs and Ls = 0. Because agents are
indi¤erent in …re sale states, is straightforward to extend the proof of Theorem 1 to
the …re sale economy, yielding Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Suppose (i) u satis…es DARA, (ii) if
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i

j

then wi

i

wj

j

, and

(iii) there is at least one state without …re sales (e.g., rs = 0 for some s 2 S). Then
every competitive equilibrium with …re sales is ex ante constrained ine¢ cient. In
particular, all investors could be made strictly better o¤ by collectively allocating
more to the short term asset.
Proof. See Appendix.

5.1

Numerical Fire Sale Example

Consider the special case where there are two types, impatient and patient ( I > P ,
I
where i = 1= i ), and two aggregate states, normal and crisis ( N
< CI ). R and r
I
are constant across states. Let u (c) = log (c), I ; P = (2; 1), R = 1:5, CI ; N
=
(:5; :1), (PC ; PN ) = (:1; :9), and e = 1. In Figure 1, we see that as liquidation recovery
r increases past roughly :8, the agents liquidate part of the long term technology in
the crisis state. And, in anticipation of this option, all else equal, initial liquid short
term investment x declines. The decline in short term liquid investment, coupled
with the …re sale option, generates endogenous volatility in t = 2 production. Note,
however, that the possibility of liquidation actually increases ex ante utility, as we
see in Figure 1: the …re sale caps the interest rate at R=r and e¤ectively improves
insurance.
Figure 2 shows what happens with the imposition of various initial liquidity levels.
Increasing x decreases the interest rate in normal times (Figure 3) and improves
utility, up to a point. Most interestingly, we see that while increasing x mechanically
decreases the t = 2 endowment in normal times, the additional liquidity actually
increases production in crisis times. The reason is that …re sales decline faster than
the fall in long term investment. Therefore, a liquidity ‡oor not only improves welfare
for the investors but also increases output in the worst states of the world.

6

Conclusion

In our generalized version of the seminal Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, incomplete but anonymous and competitive markets yield constrained ine¢ cient allocations.
Speci…cally, investors underprovide the market with liquidity: if they were to collectively invest less in long term illiquid assets, they would all achieve better insurance
and higher ex ante utility. We allow for uncertainty in the liquidity shock distribution and the long term return, which creates aggregate interest rate risk. Our key
assumptions are just that (i) all else equal, investors experiencing liquidity shocks have
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Figure 1: Varying the Liquidation Value (r) in the Fire Sales Model
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Figure 2: Varying the Initial Level of Liquidity (x). The solid blue lines correspond
to the case with r = .9. The dotted blue lines correspond to the case without …re
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Figure 3: Bond Prices, Varying the Liquidation Value (r) and the Initial Level of
Liquidity (x). The black vertical line corresponds to the equilibrium level of liquidity.
r = :9 in the right pane.
higher marginal utility of consumption and (ii) absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing in consumption. An intuitive and common argument is that …nancial institutions
and investors overinvest in high yielding but illiquid assets. We have shown that this
overinvestment holds across a number of important dimensions of generality.
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Appendix

8.1

Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016) Results for the Two Good,
I Agent Economy

This section rehashes the results of Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016), which we use in
proving our Theorems. Consider the economy that exists after liquidity x has been
chosen and all uncertainty has resolved. To simplify notation, drop reference to x and
s. This economy consists of the I impatience types, where i is the fraction of i types,
and two goods, t = 1 consumption (ci1 ) and t = 2 consumption (ci2 ). The agents
have the identical endowment (e1 ; e2 )
0. Stars denote competitive equilibrium
quantities. The utility function of impatience type i 2 I is u (ci1 ) + i u (ci2 ), where u
is twice continuously di¤erentiable, u0 > 0, u00 < 0, and limx#0 u0 (x) = 1. u satis…es
DARA if a (c) a (c0 ) whenever c c0 , where a ( )
u00 ( ) =u0 ( ). The agents are
ordered by patience: 1 < ::: < I . The budget constraint is ci1 + qci2
e1 + qe2 .
I
X
i i
De…ne D (q)
c2 ((e1 ; e2 ) ; q) to be market demand for t = 2 goods, where
i=1

ci2 ((e1 ; e2 ) ; q) is type i’s demand at price q. From Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016), we
have the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose u satis…es DARA. Then equilibrium is unique and the
following hold:
1. c11 > ::: > cI1
2. c12 < ::: < cI2
3.

1 0

u (c11 ) > ::: >

I 0

u cI1

; where

i

= 1=

i

4. Demand is downward sloping: D0 (q ) < 0
5. Equilibrium is stable: @q =@e1 > 0 and @q =@e2 < 0:
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6. q is continuously di¤erentiable in (e1 ; e2 ), and cit is continuously di¤erentiable
in (e1 ; e2 ) and q.
Proof. Parts 1, 2, 4, and 5 are proved in Geanakoplos and Walsh (2016). Part 3
follows immediately from part 1 and the Euler equations, q = i u0 (ci2 ) =u0 (ci1 ), which
hold at the optimum by the assumptions on u. The properties in Part 6 are standard,
following from the twice continuous di¤erentiability of u, the Euler equation, market
clearing conditions, and the implicit function theorem.
Intuitively, when absolute risk aversion is decreasing then the derivative of consumption with respect to wealth is increasing in consumption: @ci2 =@! rises monotonically in ci2 , meaning buyers have the strongest income e¤ects. It follows that demand
is downward sloping, which implies stability.

8.2

Statement and Proof of the Date 0 Lemma

Date 0 Lemma At competitive equilibrium, the partial derivative of ex ante utility
with respect to liquidity is 0:
@
V (x; q (x))
@x

=0
x=x

Proof. Plugging the budget constraint into Equation 2, ex ante utility is
V (x; q (x)) = max
i

cs2 0

S
X

Ps

s=1

I
X

i i
sw

u x + qs (x) Rs (e

x)

qs (x) cis2 +

i

u cis2

;

i=1

so by the envelope theorem
S
I
X
X
@V
i i 0
i
=
Ps
s w u cs1 (x; qs (x)) (1
@x
s=1
i=1

(5)

qs (x) Rs ) :

Similarly, plugging in the budget constraint, for any q the agent problem (1) becomes
max

x2[0;e];cis2 0

S
I
X
X
i i
Ps
s w u x + qs Rs (e
s=1

x)

qs cis2 +

i

u cis2

;

i=1

and the x FOC is
0=

S
X
s=1

Ps

I
X

i i 0
sw u

cis1 (x; qs ) (1

i=1
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qs Rs ) :

(6)

By the concavity of the problem and x 2 (0; e) (see Proposition 1), the FOC holds
in equilibrium. Since the right hand sides of (6) and (5) coincide at x = x in
equilibrium, we have
@
V (x; q (x))
= 0:
@x
x=x

8.3

Proof of Theorem 1

Plugging the budget constraint into Equation 2 and optimizing over cis2 , ex ante utility
is
V (x; q (x))
I
S
X
X
i i
Ps
=
sw
s=1

i=1

u (x + qs (x) Rs (e x) qs (x) cis2 (x; qs (x)))
+ i u (cis2 (x; qs (x)))

!

(7)
:

By part 6 of Proposition 2, V : (0; e) RS++ ! R is well de…ned and di¤erentiable.
By the chain rule,
S
X
d
@V
@V
qs0 (x)
V =
+
:
dx
@x
@qs
s=1
By the Date 0 Lemma, at x = x the …rst term on the right hand side is 0, so
d
V (x; q (x))
dx

=
x=x

S
X

qs0 (x )

s=1

@V (x ; q (x ))
:
@qs

Since x 2 (0; e) by Proposition 1 and since DARA holds, qs0 (x ) > 0 by stability
(part 5 of Proposition 2). Thus, the theorem follows provided for all s 2 S
@V (x; q (x))
@qs

> 0:
x=x

From Equation 7, we have
@V (x; q (x))
@qs

= Ps
x=x

I
X

i i i i 0
u
sw

cis1

Rs (e

x)

cis2 ;

(8)

i=1

where i = 1= i . By premise (ii) of the theorem and Proposition 2 (parts 2 and 3),
i2I
i2I
(wi i i u0 (cis1 ))
and (Rs (e x ) cis2 )
are both strictly decreasing sequences.
By interpreting type i 2 I as a random variable drawn with probability si , these
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sequences are strictly decreasing functions of the random variable (call them f (i)
and g (i), respectively), and we can write the weighted summation in Equation 8 as
expectation with respect to s :
E

s

wi

u cis1

i i 0

Rs (e

x)

cis2

=E

s

[f (i) g (i)] :

Since the functions are strictly decreasing, the Chebyshev Sum Inequality give us
E

s

[f (i) g (i)] > E

s

[f (i)] E

s

[g (i)] :8

So, the theorem follows from market clearing:
E

s

[g (i)] =

I
X

i
s

Rs (e

x)

cis2 = 0:

i=1

Intuitively, since wi i i u0 (cis1 ) and Rs (e x ) cis2 have the same order, they have
positive covariance. Since the expectation of Rs (e x ) cis2 is 0 by market clearing,
positive covariance implies the expectation of the product is positive:
0 < cov
=E

8.4

s

s

[f (i) ; g (i)] = E

s

[f (i) g (i)]

E

s

[f (i)] E

s

[g (i)]

[f (i) g (i)] :

Proof of Theorem 2

Given two observations, the proof of Theorem 1 can be easily adapted to prove Theorem 2. First, the Date 0 Lemma still holds with …re sales. To see this, let qs (x)
denote the conditional on x equilibrium price without …re sales, and let qes (x) denote
the equilibrium price with …re sales. If 1=qs > Rs =rs , then once …re sales are allowed
agents will choose Lis = e x. In this case, markets will not clear in t = 2. So, if
1=qs (x)
Rs =rs , then qes (x) = rs =Rs and agents are indi¤erent to the level of Lis .
If 1=qs < Rs =rs , then income is maximized by choosing Lis = 0, and qs (x) = qes (x).
From the perspective of the price-taking agents, in equilibrium the economy is as if
there were no …re sales. Therefore, since there is one state without …re sales, we will
8

To prove the Chebyshev Sum Inequality, let i be a random variable, and let f and g
be either both increasing or decreasing. If i0 is an i.i.d. copy of i, then we must always
have (f (i) f (i0 )) (g (i) g (i0 ))
0 for any realization of i; i0 . Taking expectation, we get
0
E [f (i) g (i)] E [f (i)] E [g (i )] E [f (i0 )] E [g (i)] + E [f (i0 ) g (i0 )] 0, which yields the weak version of the inequality. When f and g are strictly decreasing and i is non-constant (as in our setting),
the inequality is strict.
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have x 2 (0; e) (by the argument for Proposition 1) and the x FOC (6) will hold in
equilibrium.
Second, even though qes (x) is non-di¤erentiable at x if 1=qs (x) = Rs =rs , qes (x) is
always right di¤erentiable in equilibrium. In states where 1=qs < Rs =rs , Lis = 0 binds
and DARA ensures the interest rate falls as x rises, which only makes Lis = 0 bind
more. If 1=qs > Rs =rs , then the interest rate 1=e
qs (x) is stuck at Rs =rs , even with
a little more liquidity (since qs (x) is continuous). If 1=qs = Rs =rs and agents are
exactly indi¤erent to using …res or not, then increasing x pushes down the interest
rate and makes them strictly prefer to not liquidate any of the long term asset.
We can now sign the ex ante utility impact of a small increase in x (at x ) in
the …re sales economy. Holding prices constant, the state by state reallocation of
endowments has no impact on utility by the Date 0 Lemma. In the strict …re sale
states, the interest rate is constant and there is no price e¤ect on utility. In the strict
and indi¤erent Lis = 0 states (there is at least one by assumption), it is as if there
were no …re sales, and the proof of Theorem 2 goes through.

8.5

Statement and Proof of Theorem 3

j
Theorem 3 Suppose (i) u satis…es DARA and (ii) if i
then wi wj . Then
competitive equilibrium is ex ante constrained ine¢ cient. In particular, all investors
could be made better o¤ by collectively allocating more to the long term asset:

d
V (x; q (x))
dx

< 0:
x=x
i2I

i2I

Proof. Using i i = 1 and the fact that (wi u0 (cis1 )) and (Rs (e x ) cis2 ) are,
respectively, strictly increasing and decreasing (part 1 of Proposition 1 and premise
(ii)), Theorem 3 follows from the proof of Theorem 1.

8.6

Statement and Proof of Theorem 4

From the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3, we can now see that there is either over or
underinvestment unless (w1 ; :::; wI ) is such that
S
I
X
X
i i 0
i
0
Ps qs (x )
s w u cs1
s=1

i=1
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Rs (e

x)

cis2 = 0;

(9)

which seems like a knife-edge case. This insight gives rise to the following theorem,
which takes up the classical case of no aggregate uncertainty about the fraction of
agents who are impatient. In this case there is a unique equilibrium, which is generically constrained ine¢ cient (though we don’t say whether because of overinvestment
or because of underinvestment).

Theorem 4 Suppose there is no aggregate uncertainty, S = 1. Suppose u satis…es
DARA and is three times continuously di¤erentiable. Then there is a unique
equilibrium. Fix arbitrary discounts 0 < 1 < ::: < I , productivity R > 0, and the
probabilities si . Then for almost every choice of (w1 ; :::; wI ) 2 RI++ , the unique
competitive equilibrium is ex ante constrained ine¢ cient.
Proof. By the assumption on u, qs (x) and consumptions cist (x) are twice continuously di¤erentiable functions of x 2 (0; e). Hence we can de…ne the continuously
di¤erentiable function F : (0; e) RI++ ! R2 by
F (x; w) = (F1 (x; w); F2 (x; w)) ;
where
F1 (x; w) =
F2 (x; w) =

S
I
X
X
i i 0
i
Ps
s w u cs1 (x) (1
s=1
S
X

Ps

s=1

Rqs (x))

i=1

I
X
@
i i 0
i
qs (x)
s w u cs1 (x) [R(e
@x
i=1

x)

cis2 (x)];

and w = (w1 ; :::; wI ). Equilibrium occurs when F1 (x; w) = 0 and constrained ine¢ ciency when F2 (x; w) 6= 0 also.
First we show that whenever F1 (x; w) = 0, the derivative @F1 (x; w)=@x < 0. The
reason is that @qs (x)=@x > 0 (by Proposition 2), and with no aggregate uncertainty,
1 Rqs (x) = 0. It follows that there must be a unique equilibrium, since any function
like F1 (xjw) that always crosses the x-axis with negative slope can only cross once.
We now demonstrate that whenever the two dimensional function F (x; w) = 0,
the derivative matrix D(x;w) F has column rank 2. Note …rst that the most impatient
agent 1 must always be a seller of good 2, hence [R(e x) cis2 (x)] > 0 for all s: It
follows that @F2 (x; w)=@w1 > 0: Moreover, when 1 Rqs (x) = 0 for all s (as must
happen when there is one future aggregate state), @F1 (x; w)=@w1 = 0: We already
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saw that @F1 (x; w)=@x < 0: Hence
Dx;w1 =

"

0
? +

#

has full rank.
This rank argument shows that the two dimensional function F is transverse to 0;
F t 0; that is whenever F (x; w) = 0, the derivative matrix D(x;w) F has column rank
2. Then since the functions F are continuously di¤erentiable, by the transversality
F (x; w). But
theorem, for almost all w 2 RI++ , we have Fw t 0; where Fw (x)
Dx Fw (x) is a 2 1 matrix and thus can never have rank 2. Hence for almost all w,
Fw (x) is never 0, which means that whenever the top expression F1 is 0, the bottom
expression F2 is non-zero. It then follows that for almost all w; every equilibrium is
constrained ine¢ cient.
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